specified risk materials (SRM)
re-mad cow downers and kids
>>>But let's not forget that all specified risk materials, i.e. brain and
spinal tissue, are removed from the food supply on all cattle, whether they
can walk or not. The bottom line is that, even if my girls ate ground beef
from a cow that tested positive to BSE, their risk of being abused is
greater than their risk of acquiring BSE. And, no, I don't believe in or
practice child abuse.<<<
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2008/feb08/feb18/Cowsorkids.cfm
i had to laugh when i read that, as sad and disgusting as it is. i wanted to post this as a comment, but the data i have is much to long to post. facts usually are. if you think that feed ban of 8/4/97 held, please think again. it was only ink on paper. also, please read the latest science on the last two mad cows in in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas. the BASE mad cow, whether it be h or l BASE, its much more virulent to humans than the UK BSE. this is fact. i am not anti meat eater. i am anti stupid, anti corporate homicide, i,e. for profit. how could anyone feel safe by beef in the usa via USDA certified is beyond me. we must stop the big ag factory farming policy of 'don't look, dont find'. and the incubation period. these kids will not know if they will die from cjd for years and even decades to come. and if you think that is the only slaughterhouse that allow downers to still go into the human food chain, think again. i know of one right here in texas. nope, big ag has such a strangle hold on USDA, it will take much more than a democrat or republican to clean it up, there to worried about baseball and those over paid brats and steroids. ................ oh well, i have probably said too much///
Washington January 31, 2008 snip...
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2008/02/0028.xml
> TRANSCRIPT: USDA Officials Hold Technical Briefing Regarding Inhumane
> Handling Allegations
THE title is very misleading. A better title in my opinion would have read ;
HIGHLY SUSPECT BSE, H-BASE, MAD COW BEEF DISTRIBUTED NATIONALLY (35 states
to date), to CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY
USDA CERTIFIED H-BASE MAD COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Certain Aspects related to the Feeding of Animal Proteins to Farm
Animals[1] - Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Biological Hazards
Question number: EFSA-Q-2007-084
Adopted date: 17/10/2007 Summary
Opinion
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was requested by the European Parliament (EP) to assess, with respect to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), the safety for human health of the utilisation of non-ruminant Meat and Bone Meal (MBM). More specifically, EFSA was requested (i) to evaluate the risk from using non-ruminant MBM in pig and poultry feed, once it is possible to distinguish protein origin up to different species and (ii) the introduction of certain tolerance levels with regard to small quantities of MBM in animal feed and the parameters which could be utilized to define these tolerance levels and quantities.
The EFSA opinion takes account of the general control measures in place in the European Union (EU) and assumes the effectiveness of these controls in avoiding cross-contamination, both deliberate and accidental. This opinion considers all available scientific data and information related to the risk of transmission of the BSE agent through feed and, by this means, addresses the risk of causing BSE related exposure to humans, as well as risks related to some other TSE agents. In replying to the above mentioned questions, this assessment only considers the use of pig Processed Animal Proteins[2] (PAPs) in poultry feed and the use of poultry PAPs in pig feed. With respect to the introduction of certain tolerance levels with regards to small quantities of MBM in animal feed, this assessment considers such a tolerance for animal proteins of any species in animal feed.
To date, no Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) have been identified as occurring in pigs or poultry under natural conditions. Taking account of the epidemiological situation of BSE in cattle in the EU, which indicates a decreasing trend, together with the current control measures in place to avoid exposure of pigs and poultry to BSE contaminated material, the EFSA Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) concluded that the risk of transmitting BSE to pigs utilizing poultry PAPs and vice versa is negligible. Consequently in this scenario any increase in the exposure risk of BSE to humans would be negligible. If TSE in birds or pigs is identified in the future as occurring under natural conditions, the assessment presented here will no longer be valid.
The BIOHAZ Panel further concluded that the risk of transmitting BSE through small quantities of animal proteins in feed to ruminants can not be excluded, but considering the current protective measures in place in the EU[3], the few infected animals that could arise from this contamination would probably not be able to sustain the BSE epidemic but would increase the human exposure risk to BSE. The risk of transmitting BSE to non-ruminants is considered to be lower than to ruminants, as long as intra-species recycling is avoided. Consequently in this scenario the increase in the exposure risk of BSE to humans is negligible.
In the event that a tolerance level was required to be set up in order to quantify animal proteins in animal feed, the BIOHAZ Panel considered the Limit of Quantification (LOQ) of the method used to set such tolerance level as the parameter required. However the BIOHAZ Panel concluded that it is currently not possible to set a LOQ because of insufficient data on the performance of relevant detection methods for quantification. It is therefore recommended that studies be conducted to define the LOQ for different types of animal proteins in feed. In a hypothetical situation in which pigs are allowed to be fed with poultry PAPs and vice versa or, in general, inter-species recycling is allowed, currently it is not possible to quantify the level of contamination with non authorized products containing animal proteins in feed. Accordingly it is technically not possible at present to determine whether the contamination is below or above a defined tolerance level.
The BIOHAZ Panel further concluded that compared to the current measures in place in EU, the introduction of a tolerance level, which has to be defined at a certain level above the LOQ, will lead to an increase in the risk of transmission of BSE or other TSEs, depending on the species. This increased risk can not be quantified. ___________________________ [1] For citation purposes: Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards on a request from the European Parliament on Certain Aspects related to the Feeding of Animal Proteins to Farm Animals, The EFSA Journal (2007) Journal number 576, 1-41 [2] In Commission Regulation (EC) No 829/2007 of 28 June 2007 is defined as: “animal protein derived entirely from Category 3 material, which have been treated in accordance with Chapter II of Annex VII so as to render them suitable for direct use as feed material or for any other use in feedingstuffs, including petfood, or for use in organic fertilisers or soil improvers; however, it does not include blood products, milk, milk-based products, colostrum, gelatine, hydrolysed proteins and dicalcium phosphate, eggs and egg-products, tricalcium phosphate and collagen”. [3] Regulation (EC) 999/2001 as amended and Regulation (EC) 1774/2002 as amended.
Publication date: 15/11/2007
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej576_animal_proteins_summary_en.pdf
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej576_animal_proteins_en.pdf
If only a proportion of infected cattle can be detected, does testing provide significant consumer protection?
The extent to which testing increases consumer protection is still open to question, especially if other protective measures are in place (see below).
It is conceivable that tissues not previously recognised as infected may still be found as research continues. Infectivity levels are expected to be extremely low, and undetectable with the tools used so far. If these tissues were otherwise consumed then the destruction of the carcase would afford the consumer a greater degree of protection. If the tissues are not sufficiently infectious to pose a health risk, and/or are not consumed, then the additional protection provided may be nil.
Recent results from Japan and Germany confirm this point(2,11,12,14), with positivity or infectivity being detected in some peripheral nerves that would not normally be removed as SRM. The amount of infectivity present is low, and considered be up to 1000-fold lower than the brain. Unpublished evidence suggests that these become positive only after the brain and spinal cord. This therefore confirms that testing and removal of positive animals does provide some additional, as yet unquantifiable, protection to consumers over and above that provided by removal of SRM. Given that detection of positivity or infectivity in some peripheral nerves coincides with the onset of clinical signs, it is probable that such animals would be detected before slaughter, and therefore excluded from the food chain.
http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON_TESTING_OF_CATTLE_FOR_BSE_070516.pdf
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II ___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL ______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION
TN and WV
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
40 tons
DISTRIBUTION
LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
87 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
350 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION
AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION
MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
?????
DISTRIBUTION
KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22
71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION
Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service
Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District
http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm
SINCE THE LAST TIME I REPORTED :
Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005
Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST
YOU can see that report at the bottom of this update.
UPDATEs AS FOLLOWS ;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006
snip...
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Large HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS
On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO
On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Table 6. Administrative Actions: Small HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 6/2/06 6/5/06 X 9/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY 01248 M01248 P LINCOLN, MT 3/24/06 4/14/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X 8/15/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
GIBSON PACKING COMPANY 05843 M05843 P SEYMOUR, MO 9/21/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli). The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X 9/26/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 7/5/06 X 8/11/06 On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X 7/25/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (4/01/06 to 6/30/06)
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On
12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 4/13/06 4/19/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli).
6/2/06 6/5/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
???
3/24/06 4/14/06
X
The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
C & C MEAT SALES, INC., 18494 M18494 P, DURHAM, NC ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X 4/13/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
FRONTIER FOODS & COLD STORAGE, INC 20741 M20741 P EL PASO, TX 5/31/06 X On 6/8/06, DM closed case by firm’s requested voluntary withdrawal. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X 5/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 X On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SAVORY CONNECTION, INC., 31764 M31764 P, SELINGSGROVE, PA. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NE. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X 4/4/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X 5/4/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X 3/13/06 On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP. 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 8/11/04 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M 3/12/04 3/18/04 X
LEXINGTON, NE
X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
GULF PACKING COMPANY, 00696 M00696 P, SAN BENITO, TX, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY, 01248 M01248 P, LINCOLN, MT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
HITCHIN POST STEAK COMPANY, 20773 M20773 P, KANSAS CITY, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO., 09150 M09150 P, FAIRBURY, NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 21562 M ORD. NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
ALTA VISTA LOCKER 31931 M ALTA VISTA, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
C&C MEAT SALES, INC. 18494 M18494 P UPPER MARLBORO, MD 2/27/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X 3/6/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X 1/13/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, L.L.C. 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X 2/9/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SAVORY CONNECTION, INC. 31764 M31764 P SELINGSGROVE, PA 3/14/06 3/31/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NW, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
TEARS MARKET, 04535 M04535 P, PENN YAN, NY, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP, 31561 M BENSON, VT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P, LEWISTON, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P, GRANTSVILLE, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WILLIAM. G. MEST PACKING CO. 04431 M STRYKERSVILLE, NY 2/2/06 2/23/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. On 3/21/06, NOIE was modified and reissued. On 6/29/06, NOIE was rescinded.
YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X 2/23/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005
SRM REMOVAL USA
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005
snip....
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
00245L M LEXINGTON, NE 3/12/04 3/18/04 X 5/4/05 X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
9/16/05 9/29/05 X X TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. X X 00245D M EMPORIA, KS On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 7/20/05 8/1/05 X X 12/29/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 9/1/05 9/20/05 X X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 21562 M concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
ALTA VISTA LOCKER 10/5/05 10/26/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a 31931 M basis, failure of the establishment toALTA VISTA, KS comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 8/8/05 8/16/05 X X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
CHAMPLAIN BEEF INC 2/28/05 3/4/05 3/8/05 X X X 08547 M WHITEHALL, NY 10/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
FIVE STAR PACK INC. 9/1/05 9/9/05 X X 12/29/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 08725 M08725 P concerning failure to meet regulatory GOLDEN CITY, MO requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. FRESH FARMS BEEF 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a 18579 M basis, failure of the establishment toRUTLAND, VT comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
GOETZ AND SONS WESTERN 11/15/05 11/23/05 12/1/05 X X MEATS INC 06245 M06245 P EVERETT, WA 12/17/05 12/28/05 X X X On 12/17/05, firm violated a regulatory control action by selling U.S.D.A retained product.
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 7/28/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 7/26/05 7/29/05 X X 11/15/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
S & S MEAT COMPANY 01046 M01046 P KANSAS CITY, MO 8/4/05 8/19/05 X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
STEAK MASTER 21159 M21159 P ELWOOD, NE 11/4/05 11/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/27/05 7/29/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P GRANTSVILLE, UT 7/25/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING LLC 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
full text 54 pages ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf
Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05)
snip...
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action
21562 M
concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
08/04/05
08/19/05
On 8/4/05,
an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine SpongiformKANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05
09/09/05
On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05
On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X
LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05
On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform
GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
52 pages
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2005.pdf
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http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2005.pdf
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P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal FeedIngredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health
Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker11Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of PublicHealth, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute forApplied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA
snip...
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bonemeal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals andother meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, andanimal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibiotic resistant bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxin like compounds in animals and resulting animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections (antibiotic resistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al.668 VOLUME 115 NUMBER 5 May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. ......... http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, NathalieLescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-PhilippeDeslysSummary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiformencephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oralinfection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier totransmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE tonon-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenatefrom a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurologicaldisease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of diseaseat 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, wemade a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, whichprovides additional assurance that existing public health measures canprevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculumused in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with asimilar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. icip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infectedorally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that thedesigning scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the resultsbecause all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?
In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Wisconsin reported a debilitating neurologic disease in his herd which we diagnosed as TME by histopathologic findings confirmed by experimental transmission to mink and squirrel monkeys. The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. She had never been fed.
We believe that these findings may indicate the presence of a previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle and wish to alert dairy practitioners to this possibility.
snip...
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL WESTERN CONFERENCE FOR FOOD ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE, University of Arizona, March 17-19, 1986
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf
OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS
A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin reported that many of his mink were "acting funny", and some had died. At this time, we visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of all adult mink were showing typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by subtle behavioral changes, loss of normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings throughout the pen rather than in a single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing and swallowing, and tails arched over their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed by progressive deterioration of neurologic function beginning with locomoior incoordination, long periods of somnolence in which the affected mink would stand motionless with its head in the corner of the cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of TME was confirmed by histopaihologic examination and by experimental transmission to mink after incubation periods of four months. To investigate the possible involvement of cattle in this disease cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves were inoculated intracerebrally with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each developed a fatal spongiform encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19 months.
DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al., 1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of spongiform encephalopathy.
We are presently pursuing additional studies to further examine the possible involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One of these is the backpassage of our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink. Because (here are as yet no agent- specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for these transmissible neuropathogens, one means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and selection of the biotype which grows best in a particular host. This procedure has been used to separate hamster-adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). The intracerebral backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted in incubations of only four months indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent for mink after bovine passage. Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six months. It will be essential to demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it this proposed epidemiologic association is to be confirmed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These studies were supported by the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United States Department of Agriculture. The authors also wish to acknowledge the help and encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the course of these investigations.
REFERENCES
Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. II. Experimental and natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399. Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein, C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson, D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie. Science 172:859-861. Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. I. Epizoociologic and clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392. Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and chemical properties of the transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL 3:176-180. Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of transmissible mink encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P. (eds.) Slow transmissible diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, pp 451-460. Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a scrapie-like disease in cattle? Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference for Food Animal Veterinary Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20. Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning, R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M., Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.
MARSH
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle andL-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Thierry Baron,* Anna Bencsik,* Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,* Eric Morignat,* andRichard A. Bessen†*Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments–Lyon, Lyon, France; and†Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana, USA
Abstract
Transmissible mink encepholapathy (TME) is a foodborne transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of ranch-raised mink; infection with a ruminant TSE has been proposed as the cause, but the precise origin of TME is unknown. To compare the phenotypes of each TSE, bovine-passaged TME isolate and 3 distinct natural bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agents (typical BSE, H-type BSE, and L-type BSE) were inoculated into an ovine transgenic mouse line (TgOvPrP4). Transgenic mice were susceptible to infection with bovine-passaged TME, typical BSE, and L-type BSE but not to H-type BSE. Based on survival periods, brain lesions profiles, disease-associated prion protein brain distribution, and biochemical properties of protease-resistant prion protein, typical BSE had a distint phenotype in ovine transgenic mice compared to L-type BSE and bovine TME.The similar phenotypic properties of L-type BSE and bovine TME in TgOvPrP4mice suggest that L-type BSE is a much more likely candidate for the origin of TME than is typical BSE.
snip...
Conclusion
These studies provide experimental evidence that the Stetsonville TME agentis distinct from typical BSE but has phenotypic similarities to L-type BSE in TgOvPrP4 mice. Our conclusion is that L-type BSE is a more likely candidate for a bovine source of TME infection than typical BSE. In the scenario that a ruminant TSE is the source for TME infection in mink, this would be a second example of transmission of a TSE from ruminants to non-ruminants under natural conditions or farming practices in addition to transmission of typical BSE to humans, domestic cats, and exotic zoo animals(37). The potential importance of this finding is relevant to L-type BSE, which based on experimental transmission into humanized PrP transgenic mice and macaques, suggests that L-type BSE is more pathogenic for humans than typical BSE (24,38).
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/12/1887.htm?s_cid=eid1887_e
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
USA MAD COW CASES IN ALABAMA AND TEXAS
***PLEASE NOTE***
USA BASE CASE, (ATYPICAL BSE), AND OR TSE (whatever they are calling it today), please note that both the ALABAMA COW, AND THE TEXAS COW, both were ''H-TYPE'', personal communication Detwiler et al Wednesday, August 22, 2007 11:52 PM. ...TSS
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=19779
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H- type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE- infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H- type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C- terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) *** reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
FC5.5.2
Transmission of Italian BSE and BASE Isolates in Cattle Results into a Typical BSE Phenotype and a Muscle Wasting Disease
Zanusso, G1; Lombardi, G2; Casalone, C3; D’Angelo, A4; Gelmetti, D2; Torcoli, G2; Barbieri, I2; Corona, C3; Fasoli, E1; Farinazzo, A1; Fiorini, M1; Gelati, M1; Iulini, B3; Tagliavini, F5; Ferrari, S1; Monaco, S1; Caramelli, M3; Capucci, L2 1University of Verona, Neurological and Visual Sciences, Italy; 2IZSLER, Italy; 3IZSPLVA, Italy; 4University of Turin, Animal Pathology, Italy; 5Isituto Carlo Besta, Italy
The clinical phenotype of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been extensively reported in early accounts of the disorder. Following the introduction of statutory active surveillance, almost all BSE cases have been diagnosed on a pathological/molecular basis, in a pre-symptomatic clinical stage. In recent years, the active surveillance system has uncovered atypical BSE cases, which are characterized by distinct conformers of the PrPSc, named high-type (BSE-H) and low-type (BSE-L), whose clinicopathological phenotypes remain unknown. We recently reported two Italian atypical cases with a PrPSc type similar to BSE-L, pathologically characterized by PrP amyloid plaques. Experimental transmission to TgBov mice has recently disclosed that BASE is caused by a distinct prion strain which is extremely virulent. A major limitation of transmission studies to mice is the lack of reliable information on clinical phenotype of BASE in its natural host. In the present study, we experimentally infected Fresian/Holstein and Alpine/Brown cattle with Italian BSE and BASE isolates by i.c. route. BASE infected cattle showed survival times significantly shorter than BSE, a finding more readily evident in Fresian/Holstein, and in keeping with previous observations in TgBov mice. Clinically, BSE-infected cattle developed a disease phenotype highly comparable with that described in field BSE cases and in experimentally challenged cattle. On the contrary, BASE-inoculated cattle developed an amyotrophic disorder accompanied by mental dullness. The molecular and neuropathological profiles, including PrP deposition pattern, closely matched those observed in the original cases. This study further confirms that BASE is caused by a distinct prion isolate and discloses a novel disease phenotype in cattle, closely resembling the phenotype previous reported in scrapie-inoculated cattle *** and in some subtypes of inherited and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Oral Abstracts 14
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
Subject: In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989
snip...
The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did, it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance methods to detect it as recognised...
snip...
It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory responsibility for rendering plants in the US...
snip...
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
snip...please read this old full text document !
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006
PERSPECTIVE
On the Question of Sporadic
or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§
A link between BSE and
sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory
studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.
Such a link might yet be established by the discovery
of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations
of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various
subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced
by a continuation of current public health measures that
exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and
human food chains.
SNIP...
Sporadic CJD
The possibility that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD might be due to infection by sporadic cases of BSE cannot be dismissed outright. Screening programs needed to identify sporadic BSE have yet to be implemented, and we know from already extant testing programs that at least a proportion of infected animals have no symptoms and thus would never be identified in the absence of systematic testing. Thus, sporadic BSE (or for that matter, sporadic disease in any mammalian species) might be occurring on a regular basis at perhaps the same annual frequency as sporadic CJD in humans, that is, in the range of 1 case per million animals.
Whether humans might be more susceptible to atypical forms of BSE cannot be answered at this time. Experimentally transmitted BASE shows shorter incubation periods than BSE in at least 1 breed of cattle, bovinized transgenic mice, and Cynomolgus monkeys (12,13). In humanized transgenic mice, BASE transmitted, whereas typical BSE did not transmit (13). Paradoxically, the other major phenotype (H) showed an unusually long incubation period in bovinized transgenic mice (12).
The limited experimental evidence bearing on a possible relationship between BSE and sporadic CJD is difficult to interpret. The original atypical BASE strain of BSE had a molecular protein signature very similar to that of 1 subtype (type 2 M/V) of sporadic CJD in humans (5). In another study, a strain of typical BSE injected into humanized mice encoding valine at codon 129 showed a glycopattern indistinguishable from the same subtype of sporadic CJD (15). In a third study, the glycopatterns of both the H and L strains of atypical BSE evidently did not resemble any of the known sporadic CJD subtypes (12).
To these molecular biology observations can be added the epidemiologic data accumulated during the past 30 years. The hypothesis that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD are due to unrecognized BSE infections cannot be formally refuted, but if correct, we might expect by now to have some epidemiologic evidence linking BSE to at least 1 cluster of apparently sporadic cases of CJD. Although only a few clusters have been found (and still fewer published), every proposed cluster that has been investigated has failed to show any common exposure to bovines. For that matter, no common exposure has been shown to any environmental vehicles of infection, including the consumption of foodstuffs from bovine, ovine, and porcine sources, the 3 livestock species known to be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Additional negative evidence comes from several large case-control studies in which no statistically significant dietary differences were observed between patients with sporadic CJD and controls (16,17).
On the other hand, the difficulty of establishing a link between BSE and CJD may be compounded by our ignorance of the infectious parameters of a sporadic form of BSE (e.g., host range, tissue distribution of infectivity, route of transmission, minimum infectious dose for humans, whether single or multiple). Presumably, these parameters would resemble those of variant CJD; that is, high infectivity central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues of an infected cow find their way into products consumed by humans. Transmissions that might have occurred in the past would be difficult to detect because meat products are generally not distributed in a way that results in detectable geographic clusters.
Barring the discovery of a specific molecular signature (as in variant CJD), the most convincing clue to an association will come from the observation of trends over time of the incidence of typical and atypical BSE and of sporadic and variant CJD. With 4 diseases, each of which could have increasing, unchanging, or decreasing trends, there could be 81 (34) possible different combinations. However, it is highly likely that the trends for typical BSE and variant CJD will both decrease in parallel as feed bans continue to interrupt recycled contamination. The remaining combinations are thus reduced to 9 (32), and some of them could be highly informative.
For example, if the incidence of atypical BSE declines in parallel with that of typical BSE, its candidacy as a sporadic form of disease would be eliminated (because sporadic disease would not be influenced by current measures to prevent oral infection). If, on the other hand, atypical BSE continues to occur as typical BSE disappears, this would be a strong indication that it is indeed sporadic, and if in addition at least 1 form of what is presently considered as sporadic CJD (such as the type 2 M/V subtype shown to have a Western blot signature like BASE) were to increase, this would suggest (although not prove) a causal relationship (Figure 5).
Recognition of the different forms of BSE and CJD depends upon continuing systematic testing for both bovines and humans, but bovine testing will be vulnerable to heavy pressure from industry to dismantle the program as the commercial impact of declining BSE cases ceases to be an issue. Industry should be aware, however, of the implications of sporadic BSE. Its occurrence would necessitate the indefinite retention of all of the public health measures that exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and human food chains, whereas its nonoccurrence would permit tissues that are now destroyed to be used as before, once orally acquired BSE has disappeared.
SNIP...
PLEASE READ FULL TEXT ;
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf
full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
Qingzhong Kong*, Mengjie Zheng, Cristina Casalone, Liuting Qing, Shenghai Huang, Bikram Chakraborty, Ping Wang, Fusong Chen, Ignazio Cali, Cristiano Corona, Francesca Martucci, Barbara Iulini, Pierluigi Acutis, Lan Wang, Jingjing Liang, Meiling Wang, Xinyi Li, Salvatore Monaco, Gianluigi Zanusso, Wen-Quan Zou, Maria Caramelli, and Pierluigi Gambetti* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: qxk2@case.edu. pxg13@case.edu.
Abstract
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to have only one strain (BSE-C). BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, BASE (or BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE-affected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20-22 months incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with a sporadic human prion disease, showed presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those of the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation time are observed in the BASE-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that, in humans, BASE is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/JVI.02561-07v1?papetoc
for those interested, further into this study, it gets very interesting ;
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/evaluation-of-human-transmission-risk.html
Subject: Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98
Date: September 26, 2007 at 4:06 pm PST
P03.141
Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98
Gavier-Widén, D1; Benestad, SL2; Ottander, L1; Westergren, E1 1National Veterinary Insitute, Sweden; 2National Veterinary Institute, Norway
Nor98 is a prion disease of old sheep and goats. This atypical form of scrapie was first described in Norway in 1998. Several features of Nor98 were shown to be different from classical scrapie including the distribution of disease associated prion protein (PrPd) accumulation in the brain. The cerebellum is generally the most affected brain area in Nor98. The study here presented aimed at adding information on the neuropathology in the cerebellum of Nor98 naturally affected sheep of various genotypes in Sweden and Norway. A panel of histochemical and immunohistochemical (IHC) stainings such as IHC for PrPd, synaptophysin, glial fibrillary acidic protein, amyloid, and cell markers for phagocytic cells were conducted. The type of histological lesions and tissue reactions were evaluated. The types of PrPd deposition were characterized. The cerebellar cortex was regularly affected, even though there was a variation in the severity of the lesions from case to case. Neuropil vacuolation was more marked in the molecular layer, but affected also the granular cell layer. There was a loss of granule cells. Punctate deposition of PrPd was characteristic. It was morphologically and in distribution identical with that of synaptophysin, suggesting that PrPd accumulates in the synaptic structures. PrPd was also observed in the granule cell layer and in the white matter. *** The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
12/10/76 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY
snip...
A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem
Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries.
The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep.
It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible.
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf
Epidemiology of Scrapie in the United States 1977
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m08b/tab64.pdf
SCRAPIE PROGRAM FY REPORT 2007
Prepared by National Center for Animal Health Programs Ruminant Health Programs Team November 15, 2007
snip...
Infected and Source Flocks
During FY 2007, there were a total of 76 new infected or source flocks identified. Of those new flocks identified, 30 were infected flocks and 46 were source flocks (Figure 2). As of September 30, 2007, there were 38 scrapie infected and source flocks with open statuses (Figure 3). ...
snip...
In FY 2007, 331 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including 59* Regulatory Scrapie Slaughter Surveillance (RSSS) cases (Figure 5 and Slide 16). In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with Nor-98 scrapie. The Nor98-like cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming and Indiana respectively. Nineteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 6). The last goat case was reported in September 2007.
snip...
see full report here ;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/yearly_report.pps
Friday, February 15, 2008
SCRAPIE and TSE to human UPDATE 2008 (ambiguous terms of transition and reality set in)
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/02/scrapie-and-tse-to-human-update-2008.html
TSS
>>>But let's not forget that all specified risk materials, i.e. brain and
spinal tissue, are removed from the food supply on all cattle, whether they
can walk or not. The bottom line is that, even if my girls ate ground beef
from a cow that tested positive to BSE, their risk of being abused is
greater than their risk of acquiring BSE. And, no, I don't believe in or
practice child abuse.<<<
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2008/feb08/feb18/Cowsorkids.cfm
i had to laugh when i read that, as sad and disgusting as it is. i wanted to post this as a comment, but the data i have is much to long to post. facts usually are. if you think that feed ban of 8/4/97 held, please think again. it was only ink on paper. also, please read the latest science on the last two mad cows in in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas. the BASE mad cow, whether it be h or l BASE, its much more virulent to humans than the UK BSE. this is fact. i am not anti meat eater. i am anti stupid, anti corporate homicide, i,e. for profit. how could anyone feel safe by beef in the usa via USDA certified is beyond me. we must stop the big ag factory farming policy of 'don't look, dont find'. and the incubation period. these kids will not know if they will die from cjd for years and even decades to come. and if you think that is the only slaughterhouse that allow downers to still go into the human food chain, think again. i know of one right here in texas. nope, big ag has such a strangle hold on USDA, it will take much more than a democrat or republican to clean it up, there to worried about baseball and those over paid brats and steroids. ................ oh well, i have probably said too much///
Washington January 31, 2008 snip...
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_1OB?contentidonly=true&contentid=2008/02/0028.xml
> TRANSCRIPT: USDA Officials Hold Technical Briefing Regarding Inhumane
> Handling Allegations
THE title is very misleading. A better title in my opinion would have read ;
HIGHLY SUSPECT BSE, H-BASE, MAD COW BEEF DISTRIBUTED NATIONALLY (35 states
to date), to CHILDREN AND THE ELDERLY
USDA CERTIFIED H-BASE MAD COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Certain Aspects related to the Feeding of Animal Proteins to Farm
Animals[1] - Scientific Opinion of the Panel on Biological Hazards
Question number: EFSA-Q-2007-084
Adopted date: 17/10/2007 Summary
Opinion
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was requested by the European Parliament (EP) to assess, with respect to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), the safety for human health of the utilisation of non-ruminant Meat and Bone Meal (MBM). More specifically, EFSA was requested (i) to evaluate the risk from using non-ruminant MBM in pig and poultry feed, once it is possible to distinguish protein origin up to different species and (ii) the introduction of certain tolerance levels with regard to small quantities of MBM in animal feed and the parameters which could be utilized to define these tolerance levels and quantities.
The EFSA opinion takes account of the general control measures in place in the European Union (EU) and assumes the effectiveness of these controls in avoiding cross-contamination, both deliberate and accidental. This opinion considers all available scientific data and information related to the risk of transmission of the BSE agent through feed and, by this means, addresses the risk of causing BSE related exposure to humans, as well as risks related to some other TSE agents. In replying to the above mentioned questions, this assessment only considers the use of pig Processed Animal Proteins[2] (PAPs) in poultry feed and the use of poultry PAPs in pig feed. With respect to the introduction of certain tolerance levels with regards to small quantities of MBM in animal feed, this assessment considers such a tolerance for animal proteins of any species in animal feed.
To date, no Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs) have been identified as occurring in pigs or poultry under natural conditions. Taking account of the epidemiological situation of BSE in cattle in the EU, which indicates a decreasing trend, together with the current control measures in place to avoid exposure of pigs and poultry to BSE contaminated material, the EFSA Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) concluded that the risk of transmitting BSE to pigs utilizing poultry PAPs and vice versa is negligible. Consequently in this scenario any increase in the exposure risk of BSE to humans would be negligible. If TSE in birds or pigs is identified in the future as occurring under natural conditions, the assessment presented here will no longer be valid.
The BIOHAZ Panel further concluded that the risk of transmitting BSE through small quantities of animal proteins in feed to ruminants can not be excluded, but considering the current protective measures in place in the EU[3], the few infected animals that could arise from this contamination would probably not be able to sustain the BSE epidemic but would increase the human exposure risk to BSE. The risk of transmitting BSE to non-ruminants is considered to be lower than to ruminants, as long as intra-species recycling is avoided. Consequently in this scenario the increase in the exposure risk of BSE to humans is negligible.
In the event that a tolerance level was required to be set up in order to quantify animal proteins in animal feed, the BIOHAZ Panel considered the Limit of Quantification (LOQ) of the method used to set such tolerance level as the parameter required. However the BIOHAZ Panel concluded that it is currently not possible to set a LOQ because of insufficient data on the performance of relevant detection methods for quantification. It is therefore recommended that studies be conducted to define the LOQ for different types of animal proteins in feed. In a hypothetical situation in which pigs are allowed to be fed with poultry PAPs and vice versa or, in general, inter-species recycling is allowed, currently it is not possible to quantify the level of contamination with non authorized products containing animal proteins in feed. Accordingly it is technically not possible at present to determine whether the contamination is below or above a defined tolerance level.
The BIOHAZ Panel further concluded that compared to the current measures in place in EU, the introduction of a tolerance level, which has to be defined at a certain level above the LOQ, will lead to an increase in the risk of transmission of BSE or other TSEs, depending on the species. This increased risk can not be quantified. ___________________________ [1] For citation purposes: Opinion of the Scientific Panel on Biological Hazards on a request from the European Parliament on Certain Aspects related to the Feeding of Animal Proteins to Farm Animals, The EFSA Journal (2007) Journal number 576, 1-41 [2] In Commission Regulation (EC) No 829/2007 of 28 June 2007 is defined as: “animal protein derived entirely from Category 3 material, which have been treated in accordance with Chapter II of Annex VII so as to render them suitable for direct use as feed material or for any other use in feedingstuffs, including petfood, or for use in organic fertilisers or soil improvers; however, it does not include blood products, milk, milk-based products, colostrum, gelatine, hydrolysed proteins and dicalcium phosphate, eggs and egg-products, tricalcium phosphate and collagen”. [3] Regulation (EC) 999/2001 as amended and Regulation (EC) 1774/2002 as amended.
Publication date: 15/11/2007
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej576_animal_proteins_summary_en.pdf
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/Scientific_Opinion/biohaz_op_ej576_animal_proteins_en.pdf
If only a proportion of infected cattle can be detected, does testing provide significant consumer protection?
The extent to which testing increases consumer protection is still open to question, especially if other protective measures are in place (see below).
It is conceivable that tissues not previously recognised as infected may still be found as research continues. Infectivity levels are expected to be extremely low, and undetectable with the tools used so far. If these tissues were otherwise consumed then the destruction of the carcase would afford the consumer a greater degree of protection. If the tissues are not sufficiently infectious to pose a health risk, and/or are not consumed, then the additional protection provided may be nil.
Recent results from Japan and Germany confirm this point(2,11,12,14), with positivity or infectivity being detected in some peripheral nerves that would not normally be removed as SRM. The amount of infectivity present is low, and considered be up to 1000-fold lower than the brain. Unpublished evidence suggests that these become positive only after the brain and spinal cord. This therefore confirms that testing and removal of positive animals does provide some additional, as yet unquantifiable, protection to consumers over and above that provided by removal of SRM. Given that detection of positivity or infectivity in some peripheral nerves coincides with the onset of clinical signs, it is probable that such animals would be detected before slaughter, and therefore excluded from the food chain.
http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON_TESTING_OF_CATTLE_FOR_BSE_070516.pdf
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II ___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling’s 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI – 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J – PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A-BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL ______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION
TN and WV
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II ______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION
KY
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
40 tons
DISTRIBUTION
LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
87 tons
DISTRIBUTION
MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
350 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE
All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION
AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6
CODE
All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION
MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
125 tons
DISTRIBUTION
AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT
Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6
CODE None
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
?????
DISTRIBUTION
KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22
71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION
Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service
Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District
http://www.fda.gov/foi/warning_letters/g5883d.htm
SINCE THE LAST TIME I REPORTED :
Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005
Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST
YOU can see that report at the bottom of this update.
UPDATEs AS FOLLOWS ;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2006
snip...
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Large HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS
On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO
On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Table 6. Administrative Actions: Small HACCP Plants (7/01/06 to 9/30/06)
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 6/2/06 6/5/06 X 9/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY 01248 M01248 P LINCOLN, MT 3/24/06 4/14/06 X 8/31/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X 8/15/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
GIBSON PACKING COMPANY 05843 M05843 P SEYMOUR, MO 9/21/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli). The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X 9/26/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 7/5/06 X 8/11/06 On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X 7/25/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT April 1, 2006 through June 30, 2006
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (4/01/06 to 6/30/06)
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X On 6/15/06, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On
12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC 00245L M LEXINGTON, NE X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
SSOP HACCP SPS INH INT Other LOI LOW
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
BOOKER PACKING COMPANY 07162 M BOOKER, TX 4/13/06 4/19/06 X Plant failed to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli).
6/2/06 6/5/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
GULF PACKING COMPANY 00696 M00696 P SAN BENITO, TX 2/25/06 2/26/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
???
3/24/06 4/14/06
X
The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 4/13/06 4/17/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
C & C MEAT SALES, INC., 18494 M18494 P, DURHAM, NC ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X 4/13/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
FRONTIER FOODS & COLD STORAGE, INC 20741 M20741 P EL PASO, TX 5/31/06 X On 6/8/06, DM closed case by firm’s requested voluntary withdrawal. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
HORMANN MEAT COMPANY 05544 M05544 P FAIR GROVE, MO 6/15/06 6/22/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X 5/19/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO. 09150 M09150 P LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, GA 3/16/06 4/14/06 6/30/06 X On 3/16/06, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E.coli) was issued. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SAVORY CONNECTION, INC., 31764 M31764 P, SELINGSGROVE, PA. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NE. ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL.
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X 4/4/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/25/05 7/29/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X 5/4/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006
Table 5. Administrative Actions: Large HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X 3/13/06 On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
EXCEL CORP. 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 8/11/04 2/22/05 X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245L M 3/12/04 3/18/04 X
LEXINGTON, NE
X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 00245D M EMPORIA, KS X On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
GULF PACKING COMPANY, 00696 M00696 P, SAN BENITO, TX, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
HI COUNTRY BEEF JERKY, 01248 M01248 P, LINCOLN, MT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
HITCHIN POST STEAK COMPANY, 20773 M20773 P, KANSAS CITY, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
ROCK CREEK SLAUGHTER CO., 09150 M09150 P, FAIRBURY, NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
WEST MISSOURI BEEF 05821 M ROCKVILLE, MO 3/2/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (1/01/06 to 3/31/06)
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 21562 M ORD. NE, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
ALTA VISTA LOCKER 31931 M ALTA VISTA, KS, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
C&C MEAT SALES, INC. 18494 M18494 P UPPER MARLBORO, MD 2/27/06 3/16/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
FRESH FARMS BEEF 18579 M RUTLAND, VT 12/16/05 12/28/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X 3/6/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X 1/13/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, L.L.C. 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X 2/9/06 The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
SAVORY CONNECTION, INC. 31764 M31764 P SELINGSGROVE, PA 3/14/06 3/31/06 X The enforcement action included, as basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
STEAK MASTER, 21159 M21159 P, ELWOOD, NW, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
TEARS MARKET, 04535 M04535 P, PENN YAN, NY, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP, 31561 M BENSON, VT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC. 31647 M31647 P, LEWISTON, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P, GRANTSVILLE, UT, ... FAILURE TO COMPLY CONCERNING SRM MATERIAL
snip...
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING L.L.C. 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
WILLIAM. G. MEST PACKING CO. 04431 M STRYKERSVILLE, NY 2/2/06 2/23/06 X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. On 3/21/06, NOIE was modified and reissued. On 6/29/06, NOIE was rescinded.
YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X 2/23/06 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
snip...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005
SRM REMOVAL USA
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT October 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005
snip....
CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS 00086K M DODGE CITY, KS X X On 10/11/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
EXCEL CORP 00086R M FORT MORGAN, CO 2/22/05 X X On 8/11/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8. On 12/22/04, plant appealed the withholding action. Appeal was denied on 1/25/05.
00245L M LEXINGTON, NE 3/12/04 3/18/04 X 5/4/05 X X On 3/10/05, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
9/16/05 9/29/05 X X TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. 09268 M PASCO, WA X X On 7/28/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
TYSON FRESH MEATS INC. X X 00245D M EMPORIA, KS On 12/23/04, a withholding action concerning labels for Advanced Meat Recovery System product was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.8.
DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 7/20/05 8/1/05 X X 12/29/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
NORTHERN PACKING COMPANY INC. 00571 M BRIAR HILL, NY 12/9/05 12/23/05 X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 9/1/05 9/20/05 X X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 21562 M concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
ALTA VISTA LOCKER 10/5/05 10/26/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a 31931 M basis, failure of the establishment toALTA VISTA, KS comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 8/8/05 8/16/05 X X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
CHAMPLAIN BEEF INC 2/28/05 3/4/05 3/8/05 X X X 08547 M WHITEHALL, NY 10/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
FIVE STAR PACK INC. 9/1/05 9/9/05 X X 12/29/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action 08725 M08725 P concerning failure to meet regulatory GOLDEN CITY, MO requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) was taken. The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. FRESH FARMS BEEF 12/16/05 12/28/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a 18579 M basis, failure of the establishment toRUTLAND, VT comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
GOETZ AND SONS WESTERN 11/15/05 11/23/05 12/1/05 X X MEATS INC 06245 M06245 P EVERETT, WA 12/17/05 12/28/05 X X X On 12/17/05, firm violated a regulatory control action by selling U.S.D.A retained product.
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 7/28/05 8/8/05 8/17/05 8/19/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 7/28/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 7/26/05 7/29/05 X X 11/15/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 9/21/05 10/7/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material. PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31762 M31762 P WAUKON, IA 9/6/05 9/12/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 7/1/05 7/28/05 10/12/05 10/24/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
S & S MEAT COMPANY 01046 M01046 P KANSAS CITY, MO 8/4/05 8/19/05 X X 11/16/05 The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
STEAK MASTER 21159 M21159 P ELWOOD, NE 11/4/05 11/17/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THE MEAT SHOP 31561 M BENSON, VT 8/18/05 9/6/05 9/9/05 X X X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, INC 31647 M31647 P LEWISTON, UT 7/27/05 7/29/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 20594 M20594 P GRANTSVILLE, UT 7/25/05 8/1/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
WALNUT VALLEY PACKING LLC 32007 M32007 P EL DORADO, KS 12/15/05 12/30/05 X X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
YODER BROTHERS MEAT PROCESSING 17301 M PARIS, TN 10/3/05 10/12/05 X X The enforcement action included, as a basis, failure of the establishment to comply with Agency requirements concerning specified risk material.
full text 54 pages ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2006.pdf
Subject: USDA FSIS QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT (BSE) July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005 Date: March 20, 2006 at 12:58 pm PST
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE QUARTERLY ENFORCEMENT REPORT July 1, 2005 through September 30, 2005
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
DESERET MEAT 04852 M SPANISH FORK, UT 07/27/05 08/01/05 X On 7/27/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
MONTEBELLO MEAT PROCESSING, INC 19075 M19075 P MANATI, PR 08/01/05 08/18/05 X 09/26/05 On 8/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Table 7. Administrative Actions: Very Small HACCP Plants (7/01/05 to 9/30/05)
snip...
A.J. CEKAK'S MEAT MARKET 09/01/05 09/20/05 On 9/1/05, an enforcement action
21562 M
concerning failure to meet regulatory ORD, NE requirements for Escherichia coli X X X Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
BROWN'S PROCESSING 13100 M13100 P ELSBERRY, MO 08/08/05 08/16/05 X On 8/8/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
FIVE STAR PACK INC. 08725 M08725 P GOLDEN CITY, MO 09/01/05 09/09/05 X X On 9/1/05, an enforcement action concerning failure to meet regulatory requirements for Escherichia coli Biotype 1 (E. coli) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
H AND P MEATS 21352 M SOUTH PITTSBURG, TN 07/28/05 08/08/05 08/17/05 08/19/05 X X On 8/17/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
HOPKINS PACKING COMPANY 11069 M BLACKFOOT, ID 07/28/05 08/01/05 X On 7/28/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
NORTHWEST PREMIUM MEATS LLC 11032 M11032 P NAMPA, ID 07/26/05 07/29/05 X X On 7/26/05, a suspension action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
snip...
PARADISE LOCKER MEATS 31865 M31865 P TRIMBLE, MO 09/21/05 X On 9/21/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
PARAGON SPRAY DRYING, LLC 31792 M31792 P WAUKON, IA 09/06/05 09/12/05 X On 9/6/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
RANDALL MEAT COMPANY 10669 M HOT SPRINGS, AR 07/01/05 07/28/05 X On 7/1/05, an enforcement action concerning Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
snip...
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
08/04/05
08/19/05
On 8/4/05,
an enforcement action 01046 M01046 P concerning Bovine SpongiformKANSAS CITY, MO X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.4.
Administrative Actions Pending or Taken at Very Small HACCP Plants [includes actions initiated in prior quarters]
snip...
THE MEAT SHOP 08/18/05 09/06/05
09/09/05
On 9/6/05, a suspension action 31561 M concerning Bovine SpongiformBENSON, VT Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3. XX X X X
THEURER'S QUALITY MEATS, 07/27/05 07/29/05
On 7/27/05, a suspension action INC concerning Bovine Spongiform31647 M31647 P Encephalopathy and Specified Risk X X
LEWISTON, UT Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
TOOELE VALLEY MEATS 07/25/05 08/01/05
On 7/25/05, a suspension action 20594 M20594 Pconcerning Bovine Spongiform
GRANTSVILLE, UT X X Encephalopathy and Specified Risk Material was taken in accordance with 9 CFR Part 500.3.
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52 pages
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q4_FY2005.pdf
PREVIOUS
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q3_FY2005.pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q2_FY2005.pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/QER_Q1_FY2005.pdf
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
What Do We Feed to Food-Production Animals? A Review of Animal FeedIngredients and Their Potential Impacts on Human Health
Amy R. Sapkota,1,2 Lisa Y. Lefferts,1,3 Shawn McKenzie,1 and Polly Walker11Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, Bloomberg School of PublicHealth, Baltimore, Maryland, USA; 2Maryland Institute forApplied Environmental Health, College of Health and Human Performance,University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA;3Lisa Y. Lefferts Consulting, Nellysford, Virginia, USA
snip...
Table 1. Animal feed ingredients that are legally used in U.S. animal feeds
Animal
Rendered animal protein from Meat meal, meat meal tankage, meat and bonemeal, poultry meal, animal the slaughter of food by-product meal, dried animal blood, blood meal, feather meal, egg-shell production animals andother meal, hydrolyzed whole poultry, hydrolyzed hair, bone marrow, andanimal animals digest from dead, dying, diseased, or disabled animals including deer and elk Animal waste Dried ruminant waste, dried swine waste, dried poultry litter, and undried processed animal waste products
snip...
Conclusions
Food-animal production in the United States has changed markedly in the past century, and these changes have paralleled major changes in animal feed formulations. While this industrialized system of food-animal production may result in increased production efficiencies, some of the changes in animal feeding practices may result in unintended adverse health consequences for consumers of animal-based food products. Currently, the use of animal feed ingredients, including rendered animal products, animal waste, antibiotics, metals, and fats, could result in higher levels of bacteria, antibiotic resistant bacteria, prions, arsenic, and dioxin like compounds in animals and resulting animal-based food products intended for human consumption. Subsequent human health effects among consumers could include increases in bacterial infections (antibiotic resistant and nonresistant) and increases in the risk of developing chronic (often fatal) diseases such as vCJD. Nevertheless, in spite of the wide range of potential human health impacts that could result from animal feeding practices, there are little data collected at the federal or state level concerning the amounts of specific ingredients that are intentionally included in U.S. animal feed. In addition, almost no biological or chemical testing is conducted on complete U.S. animal feeds; insufficient testing is performed on retail meat products; and human health effects data are not appropriately linked to this information. These surveillance inadequacies make it difficult to conduct rigorous epidemiologic studies and risk assessments that could identify the extent to which specific human health risks are ultimately associated with animal feeding practices. For example, as noted above, there are insufficient data to determine whether other human foodborne bacterial illnesses besides those caused by S. enterica serotype Agona are associated with animal feeding practices. Likewise, there are insufficient data to determine the percentage of antibiotic-resistant human bacterial infections that are attributed to the nontherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed. Moreover, little research has been conducted to determine whether the use of organoarsenicals in animal feed, which can lead to elevated levels of arsenic in meat products (Lasky et al. 2004), contributes to increases in cancer risk. In order to address these research gaps, the following principal actions are necessary within the United States: a) implementation of a nationwide reporting system of the specific amounts and types of feed ingredients of concern to public health that are incorporated into animal feed, including antibiotics, arsenicals, rendered animal products, fats, and animal waste; b) funding and development of robust surveillance systems that monitor biological, chemical, and other etiologic agents throughout the animal-based food-production chain “from farm to fork” to human health outcomes; and c) increased communication and collaboration among feed professionals, food-animal producers, and veterinary and public health officials.
REFERENCES...snip...end
Sapkota et al.668 VOLUME 115 NUMBER 5 May 2007 • Environmental Health Perspectives
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1867957&blobtype=pdf
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. ......... http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, NathalieLescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-PhilippeDeslysSummary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiformencephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oralinfection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier totransmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE tonon-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenatefrom a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurologicaldisease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of diseaseat 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, wemade a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, whichprovides additional assurance that existing public health measures canprevent transmission of BSE to man.
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BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculumused in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with asimilar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. icip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infectedorally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that thedesigning scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the resultsbecause all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?
In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Wisconsin reported a debilitating neurologic disease in his herd which we diagnosed as TME by histopathologic findings confirmed by experimental transmission to mink and squirrel monkeys. The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. She had never been fed.
We believe that these findings may indicate the presence of a previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle and wish to alert dairy practitioners to this possibility.
snip...
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL WESTERN CONFERENCE FOR FOOD ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE, University of Arizona, March 17-19, 1986
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf
OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS
A New Incidence of TME. In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Stetsonville, Wisconsin reported that many of his mink were "acting funny", and some had died. At this time, we visited the farm and found that approximately 10% of all adult mink were showing typical signs of TME: insidious onset characterized by subtle behavioral changes, loss of normal habits of cleanliness, deposition of droppings throughout the pen rather than in a single area, hyperexcitability, difficulty in chewing and swallowing, and tails arched over their _backs like squirrels. These signs were followed by progressive deterioration of neurologic function beginning with locomoior incoordination, long periods of somnolence in which the affected mink would stand motionless with its head in the corner of the cage, complete debilitation, and death. Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
Experimental Transmission. The clinical diagnosis of TME was confirmed by histopaihologic examination and by experimental transmission to mink after incubation periods of four months. To investigate the possible involvement of cattle in this disease cycle, two six-week old castrated Holstein bull calves were inoculated intracerebrally with a brain suspension from affected mink. Each developed a fatal spongiform encephalopathy after incubation periods of 18 and 19 months.
DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al., 1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of spongiform encephalopathy.
We are presently pursuing additional studies to further examine the possible involvement of cattle in the epidemiology of TME. One of these is the backpassage of our experimental bovine encephalopathy to mink. Because (here are as yet no agent- specific proteins or nucleic acids identified for these transmissible neuropathogens, one means of distinguishing them is by animal passage and selection of the biotype which grows best in a particular host. This procedure has been used to separate hamster-adapted and mink-udapted TME agents (Marsh and Hanson, 1979). The intracerebral backpassage of the experimental bovine agent resulted in incubations of only four months indicating no de-adaptation of the Stetsonville agent for mink after bovine passage. Mink fed infected bovine brain remain normal after six months. It will be essential to demonstrate oral transmission fiom bovine to mink it this proposed epidemiologic association is to be confirmed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
These studies were supported by the College of Agricultural and Life Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Madison and by a grant (85-CRCR-1-1812) from the United States Department of Agriculture. The authors also wish to acknowledge the help and encouragement of Robert Hanson who died during the course of these investigations.
REFERENCES
Burger, D. and Hartsough, G.R. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. II. Experimental and natural transmission. J. Infec. Dis. 115:393-399. Hanson, R.P., Eckroade, R.3., Marsh, R.F., ZuRhein, C.M., Kanitz, C.L. and Gustatson, D.P. 1971. Susceptibility of mink to sheep scrapie. Science 172:859-861. Hansough, G.R. and Burger, D. 1965. Encephalopathy of mink. I. Epizoociologic and clinical observations. 3. Infec. Dis. 115:387-392. Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1969. Physical and chemical properties of the transmissible mink encephalopathy agent. 3. ViroL 3:176-180. Marsh, R.F. and Hanson, R.P. 1979. On the origin of transmissible mink encephalopathy. In Hadlow, W.J. and Prusiner, S.P. (eds.) Slow transmissible diseases of the nervous system. Vol. 1, Academic Press, New York, pp 451-460. Marsh, R.F. and Hartsough, G.R. 1986. Is there a scrapie-like disease in cattle? Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Western Conference for Food Animal Veterinary Medicine. University of Arizona, pp 20. Wells, G.A.H., Scott, A.C., Johnson, C.T., Cunning, R.F., Hancock, R.D., Jeffrey, M., Dawson, M. and Bradley, R. 1987. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy in cattle. Vet. Rec. 121:419-420.
MARSH
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle andL-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model
Thierry Baron,* Anna Bencsik,* Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,* Eric Morignat,* andRichard A. Bessen†*Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments–Lyon, Lyon, France; and†Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana, USA
Abstract
Transmissible mink encepholapathy (TME) is a foodborne transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) of ranch-raised mink; infection with a ruminant TSE has been proposed as the cause, but the precise origin of TME is unknown. To compare the phenotypes of each TSE, bovine-passaged TME isolate and 3 distinct natural bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agents (typical BSE, H-type BSE, and L-type BSE) were inoculated into an ovine transgenic mouse line (TgOvPrP4). Transgenic mice were susceptible to infection with bovine-passaged TME, typical BSE, and L-type BSE but not to H-type BSE. Based on survival periods, brain lesions profiles, disease-associated prion protein brain distribution, and biochemical properties of protease-resistant prion protein, typical BSE had a distint phenotype in ovine transgenic mice compared to L-type BSE and bovine TME.The similar phenotypic properties of L-type BSE and bovine TME in TgOvPrP4mice suggest that L-type BSE is a much more likely candidate for the origin of TME than is typical BSE.
snip...
Conclusion
These studies provide experimental evidence that the Stetsonville TME agentis distinct from typical BSE but has phenotypic similarities to L-type BSE in TgOvPrP4 mice. Our conclusion is that L-type BSE is a more likely candidate for a bovine source of TME infection than typical BSE. In the scenario that a ruminant TSE is the source for TME infection in mink, this would be a second example of transmission of a TSE from ruminants to non-ruminants under natural conditions or farming practices in addition to transmission of typical BSE to humans, domestic cats, and exotic zoo animals(37). The potential importance of this finding is relevant to L-type BSE, which based on experimental transmission into humanized PrP transgenic mice and macaques, suggests that L-type BSE is more pathogenic for humans than typical BSE (24,38).
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/12/1887.htm?s_cid=eid1887_e
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
USA MAD COW CASES IN ALABAMA AND TEXAS
***PLEASE NOTE***
USA BASE CASE, (ATYPICAL BSE), AND OR TSE (whatever they are calling it today), please note that both the ALABAMA COW, AND THE TEXAS COW, both were ''H-TYPE'', personal communication Detwiler et al Wednesday, August 22, 2007 11:52 PM. ...TSS
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0708&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=19779
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H- type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE- infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H- type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C- terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) *** reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
FC5.5.2
Transmission of Italian BSE and BASE Isolates in Cattle Results into a Typical BSE Phenotype and a Muscle Wasting Disease
Zanusso, G1; Lombardi, G2; Casalone, C3; D’Angelo, A4; Gelmetti, D2; Torcoli, G2; Barbieri, I2; Corona, C3; Fasoli, E1; Farinazzo, A1; Fiorini, M1; Gelati, M1; Iulini, B3; Tagliavini, F5; Ferrari, S1; Monaco, S1; Caramelli, M3; Capucci, L2 1University of Verona, Neurological and Visual Sciences, Italy; 2IZSLER, Italy; 3IZSPLVA, Italy; 4University of Turin, Animal Pathology, Italy; 5Isituto Carlo Besta, Italy
The clinical phenotype of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been extensively reported in early accounts of the disorder. Following the introduction of statutory active surveillance, almost all BSE cases have been diagnosed on a pathological/molecular basis, in a pre-symptomatic clinical stage. In recent years, the active surveillance system has uncovered atypical BSE cases, which are characterized by distinct conformers of the PrPSc, named high-type (BSE-H) and low-type (BSE-L), whose clinicopathological phenotypes remain unknown. We recently reported two Italian atypical cases with a PrPSc type similar to BSE-L, pathologically characterized by PrP amyloid plaques. Experimental transmission to TgBov mice has recently disclosed that BASE is caused by a distinct prion strain which is extremely virulent. A major limitation of transmission studies to mice is the lack of reliable information on clinical phenotype of BASE in its natural host. In the present study, we experimentally infected Fresian/Holstein and Alpine/Brown cattle with Italian BSE and BASE isolates by i.c. route. BASE infected cattle showed survival times significantly shorter than BSE, a finding more readily evident in Fresian/Holstein, and in keeping with previous observations in TgBov mice. Clinically, BSE-infected cattle developed a disease phenotype highly comparable with that described in field BSE cases and in experimentally challenged cattle. On the contrary, BASE-inoculated cattle developed an amyotrophic disorder accompanied by mental dullness. The molecular and neuropathological profiles, including PrP deposition pattern, closely matched those observed in the original cases. This study further confirms that BASE is caused by a distinct prion isolate and discloses a novel disease phenotype in cattle, closely resembling the phenotype previous reported in scrapie-inoculated cattle *** and in some subtypes of inherited and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Oral Abstracts 14
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
Subject: In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells
Gerald Wells: Report of the Visit to USA, April-May 1989
snip...
The general opinion of those present was that BSE, as an overt disease phenomenon, _could exist in the USA, but if it did, it was very rare. The need for improved and specific surveillance methods to detect it as recognised...
snip...
It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory responsibility for rendering plants in the US...
snip...
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
snip...please read this old full text document !
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006
PERSPECTIVE
On the Question of Sporadic
or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§
A link between BSE and
sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory
studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.
Such a link might yet be established by the discovery
of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations
of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various
subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced
by a continuation of current public health measures that
exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and
human food chains.
SNIP...
Sporadic CJD
The possibility that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD might be due to infection by sporadic cases of BSE cannot be dismissed outright. Screening programs needed to identify sporadic BSE have yet to be implemented, and we know from already extant testing programs that at least a proportion of infected animals have no symptoms and thus would never be identified in the absence of systematic testing. Thus, sporadic BSE (or for that matter, sporadic disease in any mammalian species) might be occurring on a regular basis at perhaps the same annual frequency as sporadic CJD in humans, that is, in the range of 1 case per million animals.
Whether humans might be more susceptible to atypical forms of BSE cannot be answered at this time. Experimentally transmitted BASE shows shorter incubation periods than BSE in at least 1 breed of cattle, bovinized transgenic mice, and Cynomolgus monkeys (12,13). In humanized transgenic mice, BASE transmitted, whereas typical BSE did not transmit (13). Paradoxically, the other major phenotype (H) showed an unusually long incubation period in bovinized transgenic mice (12).
The limited experimental evidence bearing on a possible relationship between BSE and sporadic CJD is difficult to interpret. The original atypical BASE strain of BSE had a molecular protein signature very similar to that of 1 subtype (type 2 M/V) of sporadic CJD in humans (5). In another study, a strain of typical BSE injected into humanized mice encoding valine at codon 129 showed a glycopattern indistinguishable from the same subtype of sporadic CJD (15). In a third study, the glycopatterns of both the H and L strains of atypical BSE evidently did not resemble any of the known sporadic CJD subtypes (12).
To these molecular biology observations can be added the epidemiologic data accumulated during the past 30 years. The hypothesis that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD are due to unrecognized BSE infections cannot be formally refuted, but if correct, we might expect by now to have some epidemiologic evidence linking BSE to at least 1 cluster of apparently sporadic cases of CJD. Although only a few clusters have been found (and still fewer published), every proposed cluster that has been investigated has failed to show any common exposure to bovines. For that matter, no common exposure has been shown to any environmental vehicles of infection, including the consumption of foodstuffs from bovine, ovine, and porcine sources, the 3 livestock species known to be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Additional negative evidence comes from several large case-control studies in which no statistically significant dietary differences were observed between patients with sporadic CJD and controls (16,17).
On the other hand, the difficulty of establishing a link between BSE and CJD may be compounded by our ignorance of the infectious parameters of a sporadic form of BSE (e.g., host range, tissue distribution of infectivity, route of transmission, minimum infectious dose for humans, whether single or multiple). Presumably, these parameters would resemble those of variant CJD; that is, high infectivity central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues of an infected cow find their way into products consumed by humans. Transmissions that might have occurred in the past would be difficult to detect because meat products are generally not distributed in a way that results in detectable geographic clusters.
Barring the discovery of a specific molecular signature (as in variant CJD), the most convincing clue to an association will come from the observation of trends over time of the incidence of typical and atypical BSE and of sporadic and variant CJD. With 4 diseases, each of which could have increasing, unchanging, or decreasing trends, there could be 81 (34) possible different combinations. However, it is highly likely that the trends for typical BSE and variant CJD will both decrease in parallel as feed bans continue to interrupt recycled contamination. The remaining combinations are thus reduced to 9 (32), and some of them could be highly informative.
For example, if the incidence of atypical BSE declines in parallel with that of typical BSE, its candidacy as a sporadic form of disease would be eliminated (because sporadic disease would not be influenced by current measures to prevent oral infection). If, on the other hand, atypical BSE continues to occur as typical BSE disappears, this would be a strong indication that it is indeed sporadic, and if in addition at least 1 form of what is presently considered as sporadic CJD (such as the type 2 M/V subtype shown to have a Western blot signature like BASE) were to increase, this would suggest (although not prove) a causal relationship (Figure 5).
Recognition of the different forms of BSE and CJD depends upon continuing systematic testing for both bovines and humans, but bovine testing will be vulnerable to heavy pressure from industry to dismantle the program as the commercial impact of declining BSE cases ceases to be an issue. Industry should be aware, however, of the implications of sporadic BSE. Its occurrence would necessitate the indefinite retention of all of the public health measures that exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and human food chains, whereas its nonoccurrence would permit tissues that are now destroyed to be used as before, once orally acquired BSE has disappeared.
SNIP...
PLEASE READ FULL TEXT ;
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf
full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
Qingzhong Kong*, Mengjie Zheng, Cristina Casalone, Liuting Qing, Shenghai Huang, Bikram Chakraborty, Ping Wang, Fusong Chen, Ignazio Cali, Cristiano Corona, Francesca Martucci, Barbara Iulini, Pierluigi Acutis, Lan Wang, Jingjing Liang, Meiling Wang, Xinyi Li, Salvatore Monaco, Gianluigi Zanusso, Wen-Quan Zou, Maria Caramelli, and Pierluigi Gambetti* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: qxk2@case.edu. pxg13@case.edu.
Abstract
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to have only one strain (BSE-C). BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, BASE (or BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE-affected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20-22 months incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with a sporadic human prion disease, showed presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those of the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation time are observed in the BASE-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that, in humans, BASE is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/JVI.02561-07v1?papetoc
for those interested, further into this study, it gets very interesting ;
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/evaluation-of-human-transmission-risk.html
Subject: Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98
Date: September 26, 2007 at 4:06 pm PST
P03.141
Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98
Gavier-Widén, D1; Benestad, SL2; Ottander, L1; Westergren, E1 1National Veterinary Insitute, Sweden; 2National Veterinary Institute, Norway
Nor98 is a prion disease of old sheep and goats. This atypical form of scrapie was first described in Norway in 1998. Several features of Nor98 were shown to be different from classical scrapie including the distribution of disease associated prion protein (PrPd) accumulation in the brain. The cerebellum is generally the most affected brain area in Nor98. The study here presented aimed at adding information on the neuropathology in the cerebellum of Nor98 naturally affected sheep of various genotypes in Sweden and Norway. A panel of histochemical and immunohistochemical (IHC) stainings such as IHC for PrPd, synaptophysin, glial fibrillary acidic protein, amyloid, and cell markers for phagocytic cells were conducted. The type of histological lesions and tissue reactions were evaluated. The types of PrPd deposition were characterized. The cerebellar cortex was regularly affected, even though there was a variation in the severity of the lesions from case to case. Neuropil vacuolation was more marked in the molecular layer, but affected also the granular cell layer. There was a loss of granule cells. Punctate deposition of PrPd was characteristic. It was morphologically and in distribution identical with that of synaptophysin, suggesting that PrPd accumulates in the synaptic structures. PrPd was also observed in the granule cell layer and in the white matter. *** The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
12/10/76 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY
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A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem
Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries.
The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep.
It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible.
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
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76/10.12/4.6
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf
Epidemiology of Scrapie in the United States 1977
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m08b/tab64.pdf
SCRAPIE PROGRAM FY REPORT 2007
Prepared by National Center for Animal Health Programs Ruminant Health Programs Team November 15, 2007
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Infected and Source Flocks
During FY 2007, there were a total of 76 new infected or source flocks identified. Of those new flocks identified, 30 were infected flocks and 46 were source flocks (Figure 2). As of September 30, 2007, there were 38 scrapie infected and source flocks with open statuses (Figure 3). ...
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In FY 2007, 331 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), including 59* Regulatory Scrapie Slaughter Surveillance (RSSS) cases (Figure 5 and Slide 16). In FY 2007, two field cases, one validation case, and two RSSS cases were consistent with Nor-98 scrapie. The Nor98-like cases originated from flocks in California, Minnesota, Colorado, Wyoming and Indiana respectively. Nineteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 6). The last goat case was reported in September 2007.
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see full report here ;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/animal_diseases/scrapie/downloads/yearly_report.pps
Friday, February 15, 2008
SCRAPIE and TSE to human UPDATE 2008 (ambiguous terms of transition and reality set in)
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/02/scrapie-and-tse-to-human-update-2008.html
TSS
posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. | 11:31 AM
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